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Abstract
Decisions under risk are often embedded in a social context that we usually abstract 
from when studying decision-making in the laboratory. In contrast to that practice, 
our experiment investigates whether risk-taking is affected by social comparisons. 
In particular, we focus on situations where some amount of money has to be allo-
cated to two parties: either the amount can be shared, or a random device allocates 
the entire amount to one of the parties. We find that the social context of the deci-
sion matters strongly: When participants are in a disadvantageous initial position 
compared to the other party, they select the risky option much more often than in a 
purely individual decision, identical in all other respects. Overall, we find that indi-
viduals are relatively more risk-seeking in the socially unfavorable domain than in 
isolation, in contrast to the favorable one, where we find no or little change in elic-
ited risk attitudes in comparison to an isolated decision.
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1 Introduction
Most decisions under risk take place in a social context. Other individuals than the 
decision-makers themselves are present or involved when decision-makers have to 
make choices under risk. In these situations, other individuals or their behavior may, 
directly or indirectly, influence the decision-maker and her decisions (Trautmann 
and Vieider 2012).1 One channel through which social context may affect decision 
under risk is the possibility of social comparison. Thus, the question of whether elic-
ited risk attitudes are affected by the relative social position of the decision-maker 
arises. The existing empirical literature on this question is inconclusive, despite the 
ubiquity of day-to-day decisions under risk for which social comparisons are pos-
sible. Our paper analyzes the influence of the relative social position of a decision-
maker on her elicited risk attitudes, using a new experimental protocol that allows 
for additional insights.
More specifically, we implement a laboratory experiment in which the decision-
maker has to choose either to share a prize with another player according to a given 
distribution, or to gamble for the entire prize. The two options (sharing or gambling) 
are set to be equivalent in terms of expected payoff, and hence the choice between 
them provides a measure of risk attitude in a social context. By systematically vary-
ing the distribution of the prize as well as the probability to obtain it, we can system-
atically change the relative social position of the decision-maker vis-à-vis the other 
player and directly observe effects of the relative social position on risk-taking.
Our experiment reproduces, in a simplified manner, important aspects of situ-
ations that involve risk in a social context, especially those for which the total 
amount, endowment or resource distributed is constant. This corresponds to cir-
cumstances in which an individual can either favor a given distribution of financial 
resources and power, or take the chances of obtaining the entire prize herself. For 
instance, an executive can accept the proposed split of available funding between her 
and another manager’s project or argue that the company should focus on just one 
of them, with the risk of losing out. A political leader may have to choose between 
accommodating the current division of power between herself and a party rival or 
1 These effects include peer effects, where the choice of a third party has an impact on the choice of the 
decision-maker (e.g., Cooper and Rege 2011; Bursztyn et al. 2014; Cai et al. 2015; Lahno and Serra-Gar-
cia 2015), social preferences, for which the distribution of risks may be a component of ex-ante fairness 
or benevolence (Brennan et al. 2008; Krawczyk and Le Lec 2010; Brock et al. 2013), more generally the 
fact to be (at least in part) responsible for another individual’s financial situation (e.g., Bolton et al. 2015; 
Chakravarty et  al. 2011; Vieider et  al. 2015), and the correlation between the decision-maker and the 
third party’s fortune (Adam et al. 2014; Friedl et al. 2014, albeit not replicated by Krawczyk et al. 2017). 
Another systematic approach is to study the correlation of risk attitudes and social preferences at the 
individual level (e.g., Müller and Rau 2016).
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go for a shootout that will leave just one of the two standing. A poker player in a 
cash game can leave the table with current possessions or continue playing until all 
is lost or won. In any of these examples, not only the relative position (being ahead 
or behind) may affect the decision-maker’s inclination to take risk, but the mere fact 
of being in a social context may lead her to take more (or less) risk. To sum up, our 
setup involves the comparison of decisions on implementing a given distribution in 
a social context, when either being ahead or behind (favorable inequity or unfavora-
ble inequity), and a control setting in which equivalent decisions are taken in isola-
tion (i.e. without social context).
At least three effects established in the relevant literature may influence risk atti-
tude through social comparisons. First, positional concerns (e.g., Charness et  al. 
2013; Kuziemko et al. 2014) may provide additional utility to winners or reduce util-
ity of losers. They may lead decisions makers to take more risk than they would do 
otherwise if there is a possibility to be ahead of another individual. Vice versa, they 
may lead decision-makers to be more cautious if gambling involves the possibility 
of falling behind. Second, decision-makers may feel gloating and envy with different 
intensity. That is, decision-makers subjectively value an additional dollar differently 
when being ahead than when catching up from behind. Bault et al. (2008) provide 
evidence for such an effect that may lead decision-makers to seek risky options that 
provide a chance of being ahead of others. Third, utility curvature may be differ-
ent in the socially unfavorable domain (behind others) than in the socially favorable 
domain (ahead of others). Linde and Sonnemans (2012) propose the idea of a social 
reference point applied to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992) that would make decision-makers risk-averse in the favorable 
domain and risk-seeking in the unfavorable domain.
With regard to the general question of whether social comparisons affect risk-tak-
ing and, in particular, if so, in which direction, the existing experimental econom-
ics literature is quite inconclusive hitherto: Linde and Sonnemans (2012) find, in 
contrast to their theoretical predictions, that decision-makers are more risk-seeking 
when being ahead of another individual. Bault et al. (2008) observe that decision-
makers are slightly more risk-seeking for mixed lotteries in the social domain, i.e. 
with consequences in the socially favorable and the socially unfavorable domain. 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) as well as Gamba et  al. (2017) in a real-effort task 
find, in contrast, that decision-makers are more risk-seeking when being behind 
another individual.2 In light of the existing mixed evidence, our experimental set-
ting provides the following benefits: the design is parsimonious, it clearly identi-
fies the effect of social comparisons, it varies systematically the relative positions of 
the decision-maker, and it compares (otherwise identical) decisions in a social envi-
ronment and in isolation. Furthermore, it avoids confounding factors—sometimes 
2 Fafchamps et al. (2015) and Dijk et al. (2014) also find that investors on experimental asset markets 
performing below the average favor positively skewed portfolios (those that have a small chance for very 
high returns), while those performing above the average prefer negatively skewed portfolios. The effects 
occur independently of whether others’ outcomes are payoff-relevant (in the form of tournament-based 
incentives) or not.
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present in other studies—such as (ex post) social preferences or specific peer effects 
(conformism).
Our main finding is that the number of risky choices is strongly affected by the 
social context. Subjects in our experiment are more risk-seeking when the deter-
ministic option involves unfavorable inequity than in the same decision in isolation. 
In contrast, a favorable social context (when the deterministic option corresponds 
to favorable inequity) does not increase the willingness to take risks compared to 
an identical decision without social context. The analysis of individual behavior 
suggests that most of this asymmetry is driven by about two-thirds of experimental 
participants who very strongly exhibit this choice pattern of becoming more risk-
seeking in what appears to be the social loss domain. The pattern is robust to vari-
ous controls and sensitivity checks. A deeper inspection of our data suggests that 
neither a difference in the intensities of gloating and envy, on the one hand, nor a 
mere concern for being ahead in an ordinal ranking, on the other hand, can explain 
all aspects of the data pattern. Among the documented effects found in the literature, 
the difference in curvature in the favorable and unfavorable social domain seems 
the only explanation compatible with our data. In particular, the hypothesis that the 
other participant’s payoff plays the role of a (social) reference point, below which 
the decision-maker is risk-seeking (social loss domain) and above which she is risk-
averse (social gain domain) seems to be consistent with the observed pattern.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the 
experimental design and procedures; Sect. 3 shows our results, and Sect. 4 discusses 
the results in light of the existing literature and existing theories of decision-making 
under risk. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2  Experimental design and procedures
The experiment consisted of five short parts: a series of risky choices in a social 
context; two dictator game decisions; a series of tasks to elicit individual risk prefer-
ences and potential loss aversion (in decisions without a social context); a series of 
risky choices without a social context (but different than in the part before); and the 
so-called ring test (the incentivized social value orientation questionnaire) to meas-
ure social value orientation.
2.1  Decision‑making under risk in varying decision contexts
We use a within-subject design that allows us to compare decision-making under 
risk in a social context with decision-making under risk in a purely individual con-
text. Since the decisions are identical with respect to the decision-maker’s payoffs 
and probabilities, differences in decision-making between the individual and the 
social context can be attributed to the context in which the decisions took place.
In part 1 of the experiment, subjects faced tasks where €10 had to be allocated 
between the decision-maker and an anonymous receiver, both being present in 
the laboratory. Two options were available. The first one (OPTION A) was the 
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deterministic (safe) option, which was the plain division of €10, i.e. the allocation 
(x, 10 − x) for a given x. The second one was the risky option (OPTION B), which 
was the social lottery where the decision-maker had a chance of x/10 of obtaining 
the entire €10 (and the receiver obtaining €0), while the receiver had the residual 
chance of (10 − x)/10 of getting €10 (and the decision-maker obtaining 0). The 
chances of winning €10 were thus mutually exclusive between the decision-maker 
and the receiver. The amount x was systematically varied to obtain nine different 
tasks, with x ranging from 1 to 9 in steps of 1. Table 1 displays all tasks subjects 
faced in part 1. Participants were asked whether they preferred Option A (hence-
forth also referred to as ‘the safe option’) or Option B (henceforth also ‘the risky 
option’). They could also indicate indifference (Option C). For that case, they 
were told that Option A or Option B would be implemented randomly with equal 
probability, realized through a draw of the computer. Each subject was asked to 
make a choice in every row of the table.
In part 4 of the experiment subjects faced a task equivalent to part 1 of the experi-
ment (see Table 2). However, now the choice was individual. That is, they had to 
decide between a safe payoff of €x and a lottery with probability x/10 of receiving 
€10 and probability (10 − x)/10 of receiving nothing. There was no other participant 
Table 1  Part 1—social context tasks
Task Safe option (in €) Risky option (in chances of winning 10€)
T1 1 for chooser, 9 for receiver 10% for chooser, 90% for receiver
T2 2 for chooser, 8 for receiver 20% for chooser, 80% for receiver
T3 3 for chooser, 7 for receiver 30% for chooser, 70% for receiver
T4 4 for chooser, 6 for receiver 40% for chooser, 60% for receiver
T5 5 for chooser, 5 for receiver 50% for chooser, 50% for receiver
T6 6 for chooser, 4 for receiver 60% for chooser, 40% for receiver
T7 7 for chooser, 3 for receiver 70% for chooser, 30% for receiver
T8 8 for chooser, 2 for receiver 80% for chooser, 20% for receiver
T9 9 for chooser, 1 for receiver 90% for chooser, 10% for receiver
Table 2  Part 4—
individual context tasks
Task Safe option (in €) Risky option (in chances of winning 10€)
T1 1€ for sure 10% of winning 10€, 90% of getting 0€
T2 2€ for sure 20% of winning 10€, 80% of getting 0€
T3 3€ for sure 30% of winning 10€, 70% of getting 0€
T4 4€ for sure 40% of winning 10€, 60% of getting 0€
T5 5€ for sure 50% of winning 10€, 50% of getting 0€
T6 6€ for sure 60% of winning 10€, 40% of getting 0€
T7 7€ for sure 70% of winning 10€, 30% of getting 0€
T8 8€ for sure 80% of winning 10€, 20% of getting 0€
T9 9€ for sure 90% of winning 10€, 10% of getting 0€
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that was affected by the nine decisions taken in part 4. An indifference option 
(Option C) was also available, and the procedure was analogous to part 1.
By comparing decisions in part 1 and part 4 of the experiment, we can isolate 
attitudes towards risk in the social context and compare them to risk-taking in the 
individual context. Social context here simply means that another participant’s earn-
ings were determined by the choices of the decision-maker.
2.2  Theoretical considerations
In the following we discuss theoretical considerations based on relevant assumptions 
for our setup. We formulate them as predictions, but not all of them can be tested 
rigorously in our experiment. Still, they help organizing our thoughts.3
2.2.1  Self‑interested expected utility maximizers
We first focus on the standard case where the decision-maker is self-interested and 
maximizes expected utility. The predictions are straightforward, given the assump-
tion that decision-makers pay no attention to the other player’s outcome. T1 to T9 
stand for the nine decisions in the social context, and T1i to T9i stand for the nine 
decisions without social context.
Prediction 1 (standard self-interest) If the decision-maker is a self-interested 
expected utility maximizer, each of her decisions in any of the tasks T1-T9 are the 
same as in the equivalent tasks in T1i-T9i.
Prediction 2 (standard self-interest—risk attitude) If the decision-maker is a self-
interested expected utility maximizer with a concave (resp. convex) utility function, 
she chooses the safe (resp. risky) option in all the tasks T1-T9 and T1i-T9i.
In the absence of any regard to the other party’s prospect, the decision-maker’s 
preferences reduce to a dependence on the standard (individual) attitudes towards 
risk.
2.2.2  Definition of social risk attitude
In order to investigate whether risk attitudes vary depending on the social context, 
we require a formal and rigorous definition of social risk attitude. We propose to 
define social risk attitude as the preference between the deterministic (certain) 
combination of two social outcomes and its equivalent probabilistic combination. 
A socially risk-averse decision-maker will prefer to combine deterministic social 
3 We partly had a more informal discussion of theoretical considerations in the original version of our 
paper, and we thank the reviewers for pointing out some of the important aspects discussed in the follow-
ing.
1 3
Sharing or gambling? On risk attitudes in social contexts 
outcomes to combining them probabilistically, while a social risk-seeking decision-
maker will prefer the probabilistic combination.








 be two generic social payoff vectors, 
with x1, x2, y1,y2 ∈ ℝ . We restrict attention to the case of two decision-makers, the 
only one relevant for our experiment. For a given  ∈ [0, 1] , the deterministic (cer-
tain) combination of x and y , denoted x + (1 − )y , is given by (1):
On the other hand, the probabilistic combination of x and y for p ∈ [0, 1] , denoted 
p⊗ x⊕ (1 − p)⊗ y , is defined as the simple probabilistic mixture of x and y (Her-
stein and Milnor 1953). Put differently, we have:
The probabilistic p-combination of x and y is just the lottery that gives x with 
probability p and y with probability 1−p. In what follows, we define risk aversion 
as x + (1 − )y being preferred over 𝛼 ⊗ x⊕ (1 − 𝛼)⊗ y , and risk seeking as the 
opposite case. Let the preference of the decision-makers on the mixture space on 
ℝ
2 be asymmetric and negatively transitive, with ∼ defined as the usual indifference 
relation. Then, the general definition of social risk aversion (or social risk-seeking 
attitude) is quite straightforward:
Definition 1 (social risk attitude):
An agent is said to be socially risk-averse on a subset S of ℝ2 and an interval 
I ⊂ (0, 1) if, for all x, y in S , it holds that for any  ∈ I:
An agent is said to be socially risk-seeking on S if, for all x, y in S , it holds that for 
any  ∈ (0, 1):
It is easy to show that if the decision-maker is self-interested in the sense that she 
never takes into account the other party’s prospect or outcome, social risk attitude 
reduces to standard risk attitude over payoffs in ℝ . Yet, in general, decision-makers 
can obviously exhibit a rich domain of social risk attitudes, for instance being risk-
seeking on some interval/domain and risk-averse on another. For example, an indi-
vidual maximizing x1 + bxa2 is risk-neutral when only her own payoff is at stake but 
socially risk-seeking, risk-neutral, or socially risk-averse (depending on the value of 
a).
The purpose of the following discussion is to clarify these conditions and derive 
theoretical considerations for our setup.
(1)x + (1 − )y =
(
x1 + (1 − )y1, x2 + (1 − )y2
)










𝛼x + (1 − 𝛼)y ≻ 𝛼 ⊗ x⊕ (1 − 𝛼)⊗ y
𝛼 ⊗ x⊕ (1 − 𝛼)⊗ y ≻ 𝛼x + (1 − 𝛼)y
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2.2.3  Social risk attitude and (ex post) social preferences4
We want to emphasize that social risk attitude is conceptually distinct from social 
preferences, or more generally, ex post other-regarding considerations. Indeed, 
the intuition may suggest (wrongly) that the relative (ex post) payoff may gener-
ate adjustments in social risk attitude. To illustrate our point, consider a decision-
maker with competitive preferences having to choe between 𝛼 ⊗ x⊕ (1 − 𝛼)⊗ y 
and x + (1 − )y , with x = (M, 0) and y = (0,M) , as in our experiment. Sup-
pose now that the decision-maker has competitive preferences, i.e. her utility 
depends only on the difference between her payoff and the other party’s payoff. It 
is tempting to think that if x1 + (1 − )y1 is below x2 + (1 − )y2 , that is if the 
certain combination gives less to the decision-maker than to the other party, the 
decision-maker will prefer to take the gamble with the hope to reverse the (rela-
tive) outcomes. In fact, this intuition appears to be incorrect: Suppose for the sake 
of the argument that the decision-maker maximizes expected utility. What matters 
then is the utility of the relative position 
(




x2 + (1 − )y2
)
 










 ; put differently it 
depends on u
[(




x2 + (1 − )y2
)]









 , on the other hand. What matters is hence not the 
valence of the other party’s payoff or the valence of the difference in payoffs, but 
how the utility of the convex combination fares relatively to the expected utility of 
the corresponding lottery, that is whether the utility function is concave or convex 
on its relevant segment.
More generally, whatever the social motivations that enter the decision-mak-
er’s utility (altruism, rivalry or competitive preferences, inequity aversion, etc.), 
what matters in the main experimental task is the relative position of the utility of 
(M, (1 − )M) , not the ‘intensity’ of the preference for (M, 0) over (0,M) . Suppose, 
for instance, that (M, 0) ≻ (𝛼M, (1 − 𝛼)M) ≻ (0,M),5 and set, without loss of gener-
ality, u(M, 0) = 1 and u(0,M) = 0 . Then, whether the decision-maker is socially risk-
seeking or risk-averse in the experiment comes down to whether u(M, (1 − )M) is 
greater than  , that is, the convexity/concavity of u on the segment [(M, 0), (0,M)].6
In general, it is easy to show that if the partial derivative of the utility function 
with respect to the other party’s payoff is always of the same sign (monotonic social 
5 The other plausible case does not raise much interest: if (𝛼M, (1 − 𝛼)M) ≻ (M, 0) ≻ (0,M) , then the 
decision-maker will choose (M, (1 − )M) in all circumstances, that is, the decision-maker will prefer 
the certain combination over the probabilistic one.
6 To illustrate that social risk attitude is not (only) determined by the type of social preferences, con-



































 with a > 1 , b ∈ (−1, 0) , c < 1 ), etc. The general nature of (ex post) social prefer-
ences (pro-social or anti-social) have little to do with social risk attitudes per se.
4 More details for Sects. 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 are provide in Online Appendix D.
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preferences), the decision-maker’s social risk attitude depends on the concavity/con-
vexity of her utility over the relevant interval.
Prediction 3 (generic monotonic social preferences) The social risk attitude of a 
decision-maker with monotonic social preferences depends on the curvature (con-
vexity/concavity) of her utility function.
In fact, the attitude towards social risk does not depend on the type of consid-
eration for others that comes into play in the decision-maker’s preferences (such as 
inequity aversion, rivalry, maximin, etc.), but on the curvature of the correspond-
ing utility function. This applies to all generic models of social preferences, such 
as inequity aversion, altruism, spitefulness, competitive preferences, quasi-maximin, 
etc.
2.2.4  Changes in social risk attitudes
Several studies have shown (or argued) that there are plausible motives for individ-
uals to change risk attitude depending on the relative social situation. Bault et  al. 
(2008) observe that for some specific lotteries and situations, decision-makers are 
willing to take more risks, and they conclude that gloating (the subjective benefit) 
from being ahead of the counterpart is stronger than the negative feeling generated 
by being behind the other party (envy). Linde and Sonnemans (2010) assume that 
the other party’s payoff plays the role of a reference point in a model with a prospect 
theory flavor. This implies that decision-makers are risk-seeking in the (relative) loss 
domain (when behind) and risk-averse in the relative gain domain (when ahead). 
However, they do not find support for their model in an experiment. Another ration-
ale for a change in social risk attitude is the general idea that being behind or ahead 
of another party generates a discrete change in satisfaction (of which last place aver-
sion in Kuziemko et al.2014, is a specific instance). Losing may generate a negative 
feeling (fixed in intensity), while winning may generate a positive one.
Existing models make similar generic predictions in terms of a possible change 
in social risk attitudes: Decision-makers tend to be more risk-seeking when  is 
low (in the socially unfavorable case) than when  is high (in the socially favora-
ble case). In the following, we make some more precise predictions.
Prediction 4 (gloating larger than envy) A rival decision-maker with gloating larger 
than envy and a piece-wise linear utility will switch from social risk aversion for T6 
to T9 (𝛼 > 0.5) to a social risk-seeking attitude for T1 to T5 ( ≤ 0.5).

















 if x1 > x2 , with 
γ > 1 as the gloating parameter. Remember that the choice is between 
u(M, (1 − )M) and u(M, 0) + (1 − )u(0,M) in our experiment. If 𝛼 > 0.5 , 
the safe option gives u(M, (1 − )M) = γ(2 − 1)M , while the risky option 
gives 𝛼u(M, 0) + (1 − 𝛼)u(0,M) = 𝛼γM − (1 − 𝛼)M < γ(2𝛼 − 1)M . Hence, 
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the decision-maker chooses the safe option. On the other hand, if  ≤ 0.5 , the 
safe option gives u(M, (1 − )M) = (2 − 1)M , while the risky option gives 
𝛼u(M, 0) + (1 − 𝛼)u(0,M) = 𝛼γM − (1 − 𝛼)M > (2𝛼 − 1)M . Hence, the decision-
maker chooses the risky option.
We now consider the case where the decision-maker obtains a utility bonus, 
whenever she earns more than the other party or obtains a utility malus whenever 
she earns less (see Online Appendix D.1 for the formal calculations).
Prediction 5 (discrete utility effect with social rank) Decision-makers with last-
place aversion will choose the risky option more often in T1 to T4 than in T1i to T4i, 
and they will choose the safe option more often in T5  to T9 than in to T5i  to T9i. 
Decision-makers with winning bonus utility will choose the risky option more often 
in T1  to T5 than in T1i  to T5i, and they will choose the safe option more often in 
T6 to T9 than in T6i to T9i.
An interesting secondary prediction regarding the discrete effect of positional 
concerns is that their effects are maximal near  = 0.5 . As an illustration, consider a 
decision-maker with a winning bonus utility, in the case where 𝛼 < 0.5 . The lower  , 
the less likely s/he is to win and to get the bonus, hence the less attractive the risky 
option. Moreover, for a expected utility maximizer, the difference in expected utility 
between the safe and the risky option decreases linearly in  . The exact mirror phe-
nomenon holds for decision-makers with last-place aversion (once again, details are 
provided in Online Appendix D.1).
Now we consider a prospect theory model with social reference point, as sug-
gested by Linde and Sonnemans (2012). The intuition of the model is straightfor-
ward: as decision-makers are (roughly) risk-seeking in the loss domain and risk-
averse in the gain domain, decision-makers will tend to take more risk in a socially 
disadvantageous situation than in a socially advantageous one. In order to keep the 
discussion tractable, we simplify the model by assuming a linear treatment of prob-
abilities (see Online Appendix D.2 for the formal derivation).
Prediction 6 (simplified prospect theory) Prospect theory decision-makers will 
exhibit a risk-seeking attitude for T1 to T4 and risk aversion for T5 to T9, while 
showing risk aversion for T1i to T9i.
2.3  Experimental controls
The remaining parts of the experiment (parts 2, 3, and 5) were designed to measure 
social preferences, risk attitudes (independently) and potential loss aversion. More 
precisely, in part 2 of the experiment, subjects had to play two dictator games (For-
sythe et  al. 1994; Bolton et  al. 1998). The first was a regular dictator game with 
10€ to be divided between the decision-maker (the dictator) and the receiver. The 
second allocation decision consisted of dividing chances (probabilities) to win 10€ 
(the ‘competitive probabilistic dictator game’ of Krawczyk and Le Lec 2010). For 
example, the dictator could decide that, with probability 70%, she will win 10€ and 
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the other participant 0€, and otherwise (with probability 30%) the opposite would 
be implemented. Finally, participants had to indicate which of the two ‘games’ they 
preferred. The first game provides us with a control for outcome-based social con-
cerns, while the second game speaks to preferences regarding procedural social 
concerns.
In part 3 of the experiment participants received a truncated and adapted Holt 
and Laury (2002) multiple choice list to independently estimate subjects’ risk atti-
tudes with stakes comparable to the ones used in the main part of our experiment. 
This three-question version of the standard choice list contains the relevant choices 
in which the vast majorities of experimental subjects usually switch from safe to 
risky lotteries.7 We also included three decisions that aim at assessing loss attitudes. 
Table 3 lists all choices in part 3 of the experiment.
Part 5 elicits social value orientation with the so-called ring test (Offerman et al. 
1996; van Lange et al. 1997; Brosig 2002; van Dijk et al. 2002). In this fully incen-
tivized test, subjects have to make binary choices in 24 different allocation tasks (see 
Online Appendix A for details). In each task, a subject has to choose between two 
allocations that give money to herself and another (anonymous) recipient. The recip-
ient stays the same in all 24 allocation tasks, and all 24 tasks are paid. Adding up the 
decisions in the 24 tasks yields a total sum of money allocated to oneself (x-amount) 
and to the recipient (y-amount). Using the ratio (x/y), one can assign a subject to one 
of eight categories of social orientation (individualism, altruism, cooperation, com-
petition, martyrdom, masochism, sadomasochism, and aggression).
2.4  Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted at the munich experimental laboratory for economic 
and social sciences (MELESSA) using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007) for programming 
and ORSEE (Greiner 2015) for recruitment. We ran nine sessions with a total of 216 
Table 3  Part 3—risk and loss 
attitude choices
Task Option A Option B
R1 50%: 5€, 50%: 4€ 50%: 9.50€, 50%: 0.25€
R2 60%: 5€, 40%: 4€ 60%: 9.50€, 40%: 0.25€
R3 70%: 5€, 30%: 4€ 70%: 9.50€, 30%: 0.25€
L1 0€ for sure 30%:  − 2.50€, 70% 2.50€
L2 0€ for sure 40%:  − 2.50€, 60% 2.50€
L3 0€ for sure 50%:  − 2.50€, 50% 2.50€
7 We cannot exclude that the truncation has some behavioral effects on choices.
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subjects; mostly students from the University of Munich.8 Subjects were allowed to 
participate in only one session.
Participants were asked to take all the choices described above. Their roles in 
parts 1 and 2 of the experiment—either decision-maker or receiver—were deter-
mined after the experiment, using the strategy method (Selten 1967; Brandts and 
Charness 2011). Resolution of uncertainty was implemented and outcome informa-
tion was given only at the very end of the entire experiment. Instructions for parts 
1–4 were distributed and read aloud at the beginning of the experiment, and upon 
finishing part 4, instructions for part 5 were read and distributed. Subjects knew that 
there were exactly five parts from the beginning of the experiment. Two-thirds of 
participants faced choices in the order described above. For one third the order was 
reversed (on the request of a referee): They worked on the individual lotteries first 
(part 4 above), before the control choice lists (part 3 above), then played the dictator 
games (part 2 above) and answered the social lotteries, before receiving the instruc-
tions for the ring test.
To determine payoffs, subjects were randomly matched with another participant 
within the session. One subject in these matched pairs was always randomly selected 
for the role of decision-maker; the other was the receiver. For all pairs of partici-
pants, a random mechanism decided the payoff-relevant part from parts 1 to 4. If 
part 1 or 2 was chosen, another random mechanism then would decide which spe-
cific task within the part was to be implemented for both participants. If part 3 or 
4 was chosen, the specific task to be implemented was determined for both partici-
pants separately. In addition to the payoff from this single decision out of parts 1 to 
4, all subjects received their earnings from the ring test in part 5, which consisted of 
their payoff from their own choices and the payoff from the choices of the matched 
participants. Matching of participants in part 5 of the experiment was independent 
of the matching in parts 1 and 2. On top of these earnings, participants received a 
fixed payment for showing up on time. On average, participants earned 15.33€, and 
a session took about 50 min.
Participants were also asked to fill out a questionnaire after part 5, including a 
short description of motivations for decisions in the experiment and questions 
regarding socio-demographic characteristics. All design details and the procedural 
details were common knowledge among participants (see the instructions for all 
parts in Online Appendix B).
8 With very few exceptions, only LMU Munich students join the MELESSA subject pool. Since there is 
more than one university at Munich, some participants may come from other universities. Many of them 
remain in the pool after graduation (with no requirement to update their status), but most of the graduates 
rarely take part in experiments, and inactive subject pool members are deleted from the subject pool data 
base approximately once a year. Given that 75% of our subjects were 26 or younger, we can safely say 
they were mostly students but we cannot provide an exact number. It is the policy of the laboratory not to 
record too many privacy details of participants.
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3  Experimental results
We will first have a look at aggregate results (Sect. 3.1), before analyzing the data on 
an individual level and taking into account the heterogeneity in responses (Sect. 3.2).
3.1  Aggregate results
An overview of the results from decision-making under risk in the social context 
(part 1 of the experiment) is shown in Fig.1. The aggregate pattern of risk-taking 
is roughly L-shaped, with subjects willing to take considerably more risk in unfa-
vorable tasks where the expected payoff to the decision-maker is smaller than the 
expected payoff to the matched participant. The level of risk-taking reaches its low-
est value at the equal split.
The asymmetry between favorable and unfavorable situations is statistically sig-
nificant. Leaving the case of the equal split aside for the moment, all comparisons 
between tasks corresponding to deterministic payoffs adding up to 10 (T1 vs. T9, 
T2 vs. T8, T3 vs. T7, and T4 vs. T6) suggest that the risky option is relatively more 
appealing, when the safe option implies unfavorable inequity. The differences are 
significant according to a Stuart-Maxwell test at the 1%-level. If we pool indiffer-
ence with the risky option or with the safe option, McNemar’s tests remain signif-
icant at the 1%-level for either pooling version and for all comparisons. Looking 
Fig. 1  Distribution of choices in the social context
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at the unfavorable situations only, statistical tests support increasing risk-taking 
from the equal split towards the more unfavorable tasks. For all binary compari-
sons between the tasks in the unfavorable domain, choices move strongly towards 
more risk-taking, the more unfavorable and riskier the tasks become (p < 0.01 for 
Stuart-Maxwell tests for all comparisons). This pattern of choice is not necessarily 
in itself indicative of a change in behavior in the favorable and unfavorable social 
domains compared to the individual context. It is overall equally compatible with an 
inverted-S transformation of probabilities as in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992). As is well established (Wakker 2010, for instance), low prob-
abilities of the good outcome are typically overweighed from 0 to roughly one third, 
while intermediate and large probabilities of the good outcome are usually under-
weighted. Hence, the asymmetry of choices could result from the typically observed 
probability transformation.
In order to test whether individuals’ choices are actually driven by the social con-
text of the decision, we compare the social tasks from part 1 with choices from part 
4 of the experiment. The nine tasks in part 4 (T1i to T9i) were the exact counter-
parts of T1 to T9 from part 1 in terms of payoffs and probabilities for the decision-
maker, but stripped from the social context, as there was no receiver. If choices are 
influenced by the social context, we should observe differences in the frequencies 
of risky choices between the individual task and the social task. Comparisons are 
Fig. 2  Difference in choices between individual and social contexts
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displayed in Fig. 2, indeed suggesting systematic differences between decisions in 
social and individual contexts.
These differences are large in the unfavorable range. For T1 vs. T1i, T2 vs. T2i, 
T3 vs. T3i, and T4 vs. T4i, individuals take more risk when facing the social lot-
tery than in the equivalent individual task, and the differences are highly significant 
(p < 0.01 for all four Stuart-Maxwell tests).9 We observe for T1 to T4 that roughly 
20% fewer subjects choose the safe option in the social context and about 10% more 
choose the risky one. The percentage of changes is relatively constant for all the 
unfavorable social situations. The fact that already a large share of subjects chooses 
the risky option for low probabilities in the individual task (T1i to T4i) partly masks 
the magnitude of the change from the individual to the social context. As an illustra-
tion, consider T1: While already only 45% of the subjects choose the safe lottery in 
the individual task (T1i), only 17% do so in the social context. Hence, in the social 
context 62% fewer subjects choose the safe option. The share of subjects moving 
away from the safe option in the social context ranges from 21 to 62% from T4(i) 
to T1(i). At the same time, the percentage increase in subjects choosing the risky 
option ranges from 32 to 36%. This is a substantial shift in choice patterns in the 
unfavorable domain.
The pattern is less clear for the favorable range. For T7 versus T7i and T8 versus 
T8i, there is more risk-taking in the individual tasks (p < 0.05 for Stuart-Maxwell 
tests). However, this result is not robust to using McNemar’s tests and pooling indif-
ference with risky choices, since many subjects simply switch from the risky choice 
in the individual context to indifference in the social context. Other possible com-
parisons do not yield significant differences. Taking into account multiple hypoth-
eses testing, one should not over-interpret the result.
Overall, we observe that decision-makers seem to be affected by the social con-
text when making a risky decision, but not in a symmetric way. They unambiguously 
take more risk when the situation is unfavorable to them, but display similar choices 
when it is favorable to them compared to a risk-equivalent individual context.
This finding is robust to the different task ordering. Remember that we have ses-
sions with the social context first and sessions with the individual context first. Gen-
erally, behavior in the individual and social lotteries is remarkably similar across the 
two orders. Mann–Whitney tests cannot reject equality of behavior between the two 
order treatments for any of the 18 lottery decisions.10 Treatment effect patterns are 
(consequentially) similarly robust to the ordering.
To further test the robustness of our results, we ran ordered probit models (col-
umns 1 and 2 of Table 4) on the choices made in all 18 lotteries (with and with-
out social context). We use indicator dummies for the nine categories of lotteries 
10 Power to detect effects is not a concern here. With 144 subjects in the order as described in the design 
section and 72 subjects in the reverse order, we get a moderate required effect size of 0.4 for a beta of 0.8 
and alpha of 0.05.
9 If we pool indifference and safe option choices, McNemar’s tests of marginal homogeneity result in 
differences that are significant at the 1%-level for T1 vs. T1i, T2 vs. T2i, and T3 vs. T3i, and significant 
at the 5%-level for T4 vs. T4i. If we pool indifference with risky choices, all tests are significant at the 
1%-level.
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(Item 1 to Item 9) as defined by the probability of winning the prize for the decision-
maker, without separating the social and individual tasks (Item 1 = 1 if p = 0.1, Item 
2 = 1 if p = 0.2, etc.), and dummies Social 1, Social 2, etc. for the task being social 
(T1, … T9) or not (T1i, T9i). Hence, coefficients on Item 1 up to Item 9 correspond 
to the average risk-taking in the individual lottery tasks, while coefficients for Social 
1, Social 2, etc. correspond to the additional risk-taking in the social context (rela-
tively to the individual one). The results are displayed in Table  4,11 with column 
1 corresponding to the pooled ordered probit estimation, while column 2 includes 
individual random effects. 
The regression results confirm the findings based on non-parametric tests. Deci-
sion-makers indeed take more risk in unfavorable social situations compared to the 
equivalent individual situations. All terms indicating the social context are positive 
and significant in the unfavorable domain (at the 1%-level). For favorable situations, 
the effect is reversed. It seems like—if anything—individuals reduce risk-taking in 
the social context for favorable situations compared to situations without such con-
text. These results are robust to using an ordinary probit model. Both when taking 
an indicator variable for risky choices only and when taking an indicator variable for 
risky and indifferent choices as dependent variables, we obtain the same pattern of 
results.
In sum, we observe some variability in the proportion of risky choices in the indi-
vidual tasks, possibly related to a non-linear treatment of probabilities, but more 
relevantly for our research question at hand, we observe a strong effect of social 
comparisons in the unfavorable domain. In such tasks, participants take much more 
often the risky option than in the individual task. To the contrary, very little, if any, 
effect is found in the favorable domain.12
Result 1 Decision-makers become relatively more risk-seeking in the unfavorable 
social domain compared to an equivalent individual decision-making task.
A side result is also that this difference observed in the unfavorable domain (in 
comparison to the equivalent individual decision-making task) does not seem to 
increase when getting closer to p = 0.5, as predicted by the discrete positional con-
cern hypothesis. If anything, the difference increases as p get closer to 0 (0.553 for 
p = 0.1 versus 0.306 for p = 0.4).
11 Our findings from Tables 4 and 6 (see below) are fully robust to using linear (probability) models or 
logistic specifications. This also addresses concerns regarding the interpretation of interaction terms in 
non-linear models (Ai and Norton 2003; Greene 2010). Further, inference based on manually calculated 
correct marginal effects does not yield different insights compared to the coefficients reported in Tables 4 
and 6. To the best of our knowledge, methods for statistical power calculations are less obvious for the 
probit models that we use. For OLS approximations, our sample size is large enough to detect quite small 
effect sizes.
12 We have run a pilot classroom experiment that was mentioned in earlier versions of this paper. All of 
our main results show up there as well, despite a smaller sample size, a smaller expected stake size and 
somewhat less control. The results of this classroom experiment are described in Appendix E.
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Result 2 The behavior in the favorable social domain is not systematically different 
than in the individual decision-making task. If at all, there is a slight tendency of 
less risk-taking in the favorable social domain.
3.2  Individual heterogeneity
We now have a closer look at individual heterogeneity with three aims in mind. The 
first one is to check the robustness of our main findings when taking into account 
possible sampling variations in other characteristics (social preferences, risk atti-
tudes, etc.). The second one is that these characteristics can be correlated with the 
strength of the effect we observe and shed some light on its psychological drivers. 
And the last one is to simply establish the heterogeneity of the sample with respect 
to the effect of social comparisons on risk-taking. For that purpose, we can look at 
the individual characteristics elicited in parts 2, 3 and 5 of our experiment. Table 5 
provides an overview of these characteristics.
One aspect in which subjects potentially differ is whether they are socially ori-
ented, i.e. other-regarding (inequity averse, altruistic, etc.). Categorizing selfish and 
Table 5  Observables from parts 2, 3 and 5
Dictator game Mean Median 10th 25th 75th 90th
Standard—transfer 2.46 2.5 0 0 4 5
Probabilistic—transfer (%) 17.74 10 0 0 30 50
Part 3 Lotteries 3 safe 2 safe 1 safe 0 safe Inconsist-
ent
Risk attitude (%) 33.33 42.59 12.5 11.57 4 obs







Neg. angle Pos. angle
Sample fraction 1.39 66.2 32.41 39.35 60.65
Fig. 3  Choices by dictator giving (left: egoists, right: altruists) in the social vs. individual context
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Table 6  Heterogeneity in the effects of the social context
The dependent variable is an ordinal scale measure for risk-taking (as in Table 4). As in column 1 of 
Table 4, the columns report results from an ordered probit regression with robust and clustered standard 
errors
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p > 0.1
Constant Cuts are threshold parameters of the ordered probit model to differentiate low risk takers from 
indifferent and risky subjects (Cut1) and low risk takers and indifferent subjects from risky subjects 
(Cut2) (also see Table  4). Lottery types are now grouped in three blocks: Unfavorable [T1(i)–T4(i)], 
equal split [T5(i)], and favorable [T6(i)–T9(i)]. Columns (2)–(4) use different sample splits for the inter-
action terms. For each column, results in the upper part of the table (the first five lines) refer to risk-
Dependent variable: risk 
choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unfavorable 0.416*** 0.441*** 0.497*** 0.549***
(0.0960) (0.136) (0.123) (0.130)
Favorable 0.141 0.0862 0.0789 0.0597
(0.0954) (0.152) (0.132) (0.113)
Unfavorable * social 0.438*** 0.450*** 0.348*** 0.370***
(0.0704) (0.101) (0.0971) (0.0871)
Equal split * social  − 0.106  − 0.338**  − 0.151  − 0.205
(0.103) (0.145) (0.127) (0.140)
Favorable * social  − 0.115  − 0.00399  − 0.0752  − 0.000248
(0.0869) (0.131) (0.117) (0.105)
X: Low dict. giving X: Non − coopera-
tive
X: Low loss 
aversion
Unfavorable * X 0.0369  − 0.190 0.0125
(0.136) (0.140) (0.146)
Equal split * X 0.0863 0.0209 0.372**
(0.182) (0.187) (0.189)




 − 0.0243 0.234* 0.205
(0.141) (0.137) (0.148)




Favorable * social 
* X
 − 0.219  − 0.0995  − 0.298
(0.175) (0.174) (0.189)
Constant (Cut1) 0.552*** 0.595*** 0.560*** 0.688***
(0.0915) (0.130) (0.116) (0.116)
Constant (Cut2) 0.763*** 0.807*** 0.772*** 0.903***
(0.0921) (0.129) (0.117) (0.115)
Observations 3888 3888 3888 3888
of which interaction  − 1944 1530 1350
Pseudo  R2 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.052
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pro-social subjects on the basis of a median split in their offer in the dictator game 
in part 2 of the experiment provides us with additional insights.13 Figure 3 shows the 
differences in choices for the two groups (for reasons of elucidation, call them “ego-
ists” and “altruists”), when going from the individual to the social context.
For both groups, decision-making in the unfavorable range changes strongly from 
the individual to the social context. In the favorable range, slight differences between 
the groups emerge. Selfish participants switch from risky to safe from the individual 
to the social context. Altruists, however, show a less clear-cut pattern of change. 
They mainly switch to indifference, from both safe and risky choices in the indi-
vidual context. These results remain roughly unchanged when we use generosity in 
the probabilistic dictator game for the sample split. They suggest that the observed 
effects of social comparisons are very widespread in the unfavorable domain, while 
in the favorable one, it may only concern self-interested participants, and to a much 
weaker extent even for them.
To see how these effects depend on other personal characteristics and to check 
their robustness, we ran ordered probit models similar to the ones in Table  4, 
including interaction terms with the different types of personal characteristics. 
For that purpose, in contrast to Table 4, we now only use three dummies for the 
different types of lotteries. This approach limits the number of interaction terms 
and makes the interpretation of the results more straightforward. Unfavorable is a 
dummy indicating that the lottery has an expected value below five [T1(i)–T4(i)]; 
Equal Split indicates the equal split lottery [T5(i)]; and Favorable stands for lot-
teries with an expected value for the decision-maker larger than 5 [T6(i)–T9(i)]. 
As before, we also include interaction terms for these lottery types with a dummy 
indicating the social context (Social). Column 1 shows results for this baseline 
specification with fewer dummy indicators than in Table 4. In columns 2–4, we 
interact the six baseline variables with an indicator variable for below-median 
dictator giving as in Fig.3 (column 2 of Table 6), for a negative angle in the ring 
test for social value orientation (column 3), and for low loss aversion (column 
4) from part 3 of the experiment. This indicator variable is denoted X. A nega-
tive angle in the ring test implies that the decision-maker in part 5 of the exper-
iment chose such that the matched participant received a negative payoff from 
taking of subjects for whom X does not hold. For instance, for column 2, the first five lines correspond to 
coefficient estimates of the individuals who did not choose a low dictator gift. In contrast, the interaction 
terms of lines 6–11 refer to the effect of the social context on subjects for whom X holds, compared to 
the other subjects. More specifically, they describe whether risk-taking by subjects for whom X holds is 
different from that of subjects for whom X does not hold. For these lines, the first three coefficients refer 
to the difference in risk-taking in the individual context. The last three coefficients describe the differ-
ence in risk-taking in the social context for the subjects for whom X applies compared to the effect of the 
social context on subjects for whom X does not apply and by the effects of X applying in the individual 
context. A significant effect here indicates a relationship of the social context on subjects for whom X 
applies. The equal split is omitted for the individual context here. Results are robust to using OLS
Table 6  (continued)
13 Exactly 50% of the dictators give nothing, €1, or €2.
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these choices. This is only possible if, at least at one point for the 24 tasks, the 
decision-maker preferred to take money away from the matched participant, with 
no monetary benefit or possibly even at a cost to herself.14 However, as argued 
above, being classified as individualistic with a negative angle already implies 
some form of competitive preferences. Low loss aversion (column 4) means that 
subjects at least in all but one of the loss aversion decisions chose the option 
involving the chance of a loss. This is true for 75 of our participants.
Social value orientation, altruism and loss attitude do not seem to be related 
systematically to the sensitivity towards the social context, when it comes to deci-
sion-making under risk, at least for the measures used here.
The baseline regression results (column 1) again confirm the pattern already 
found for the finer-grained lottery definitions in Table 4. Compared to the indi-
vidual context, average risk-taking increases for unfavorable tasks in the social 
context. If we now look at the regression results including interaction terms, 
interesting patterns emerge. For altruists—according to our dictator giving meas-
ure (upper part of column 2)—the increase in risk-taking due to the social con-
text in unfavorable tasks is still positive and significant. The interaction term for 
unfavorable lotteries in the social context for selfish participants (Unfavorable * 
Social * X) is small and not significant. This also holds for other specifications of 
the altruism indicator: None of the differences in the social context between altru-
istic and selfish participants are statistically significant if we consider positive 
(non-zero) transfers as altruistic in both the standard and the probabilistic dictator 
game, or if we define above-median giving in the probabilistic dictator game as 
altruistic behavior. Overall, pro-sociality as measured by generosity in a Dictator 
Game does not seem to be related to the tendency to take more risk in unfavora-
ble social contexts.
The differences appear somewhat larger for the split based on ring test choices 
(column 3 in Table 6). For less competitive types in the upper part of the table, as 
for altruists in column 2, choices in the unfavorable range are (weakly) affected by 
context. In this case, however, the more competitive types are more strongly affected 
by the social context (significant at the 10%-level only). Remember that the two 
measures for social preferences capture potentially different behavioral inclinations. 
Dictator giving is a proxy for altruism, whereas the ring test puts cooperative indi-
viduals against competitive individuals. The latter category cannot be captured by 
standard dictator giving decisions. It seems as if more competitive individuals show 
the strongest reaction to unfavorable situations in the social context.
Column 4 looks at interactions with loss attitude. Loss averse subjects, accord-
ing to our measure, are, as in the overall pattern, affected by the social context in 
the unfavorable domain. Low loss-averse subjects seem, directionally, more strongly 
affected. The interaction term, however, is insignificant and also defining low loss 
aversion as choosing all three lotteries involving losses or as choosing only at least 
14 In our preferred specification, we refrain from using the strict classification into types (individualistic, 
competitive, cooperative, etc.) described in Appendix A, since we only have two subjects classified as 
purely competitive and a vast majority in the individualistic category.
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one lottery involving a potential loss does not lead to significant differences. Further, 
the coefficient on Unfavorable * Social * X is also insignificant if we consider indif-
ference choices in the loss attitude task as taking the lottery involving the loss.
Result 3 Finally, we ran a k-medians clustering analysis15 on all social lotteries, 
dividing the subjects into four clusters. This analysis resulted in the following char-
acterization: the first and clearly largest class of decision-makers is comprised of 
106 (out of 216) individuals who exhibit a strongly domain-dependent pattern of 
risk attitudes in the social context (strongly risk-seeking in the unfavorable situation, 
and risk-averse in the favorable situation); the second cluster (18 subjects) chooses 
indifference very often; the third cluster shows a similar difference in behavior when 
moving from the individual to the social context as the first type, but is overall less 
risk-taking (45 subjects); and the final cluster (47 individuals) displays increasing 
risk-taking for the favorable range as well as for extremely unfavorable items.16 The 
results from the cluster analysis by types are shown in Fig.4.
The categorization of subjects can help explain the aggregate pattern. The overall 
asymmetry in risky behavior across favorable and unfavorable situations seems to be 
mostly (but not only) driven by—the most prevalent—type-1 individuals. For these 
subjects, the increase in risk-taking in the unfavorable range when going from the 
individual to the social context is very pronounced, while they even reduce risk-
taking in the favorable range. Type 2 individuals are most effectively characterized 
by their inclination towards indifference in the social lotteries, driving the overall 
observed increase in indifference in the social context.
Result 4 There is considerable heterogeneity in the sensitivity towards the social 
context, when it comes to decision-making under risk. About half of our participants 
react very strongly to the social context, both in the favorable domain (becoming rel-
atively less risk-seeking) and in the unfavorable domain (becoming relatively more 
risk-seeking).
4  Discussion
Overall, our results suggest that individual attitudes towards risk are strongly 
affected by the social context. We observe systematic deviations in social situations 
from what decision-makers choose in similar situations under risk that do not allow 
15 The K-medians clustering partitions subjects into k groups by finding k centroids that minimize the 
overall distance between data points and the closest centroid. Four clusters are chosen, since the reduc-
tion in the within (cluster) sum of squares is large until the addition of the fourth cluster, but gets very 
small for larger numbers of clusters. The use of medians rather than means (“k-means clustering”) is 
more appropriate for discrete data, as is the case here.
16 The exact clustering always depends on the random starting points for building the clusters. Hence, 
if we had randomly selected different starting points, we would have ended up with slightly different 
clusters.
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for social comparisons. In the following, we deepen our discussion outlined in the 
introduction and the hypotheses section on potential explanations in the light of dif-
ferent utility functions or decision theories in turn.
A natural contender to explain a change in risk attitude in social situations is the 
role of (ex post) social preferences. Yet, it appears (see Prediction 3) that what mat-
ters is not so much the type of social preferences than the curvature (and a possible 
change of the type of curvature in different social domains) that may imply shifts 
in revealed risk attitude. Indeed, for various types of ex post social preferences it 
is easy to find a convex or concave version, that induces risk-seeking or risk-averse 
behavior. Hence, ex post social preferences can hardly explain the result we observe 
of more risk-taking in the unfavorable domain than in the absence of social com-
parisons. Likewise, ex ante (or “procedural” or “process”) fairness concerns can-
not easily help in explaining our results (Trautmann 2009; Trautmann and Wakker 
2010). Ex ante, both options provide the same expected payoff to both participants. 
Consequently, procedural inequity aversion preferences should not affect individual 
choices unless the decision-maker has a preference for a stochastic allocation deci-
sion over a deterministic one. For instance, one could feel less responsibility for the 
stochastically implemented uneven distribution than for one that is implemented 
deterministically. Notice, however, that our subjects had the possibility to indicate 
indifference and let a random mechanism decide. Part of the strong increase in indif-
ferent choices that we observe could be related to this, but that makes responsibility 
avoidance less of a plausible candidate for favoring the risky option.
Overall our data pattern is consistent with three explanations based on (i) gloat-
ing (Prediction 4), (ii) positional concerns (Prediction 5), and (iii) a social reference 
point (Prediction 6).
Regarding the first explanation, the hypothesis that gloating looms larger than 
envy predicts—in the simplified case of a piecewise linear utility—that decision-
makers will take risks, when the probability of winning is less than or equal to 0.5 
and will go for the safe option otherwise. This fits roughly our data. Yet, one specific 
prediction is at odds with what we experimentally observe. For the specific case 
of p = 0.5, subjects overwhelmingly choose the safe option. Even more importantly, 
p = 0.5 is the social lottery task for which subjects choose the risky option least 
often, in contrast to what is predicted by the “gloating” hypothesis.
Regarding the second explanation, that is positional considerations generate a 
discrete utility bonus (in case of being ahead) or a discrete utility penalty (in case 
of being behind), we observe that, generally speaking, it fits our data, with people 
going for the risky option in the unfavorable domain, yet being satisfied with the 
safe option in the favorable one. The behavior in p = 0.5 is not conclusive, as for 
the gloating hypothesis, the behavior of decision-makers for equal positions is left 
undetermined in the model.17 Yet, as stated in Sect.  3.1, the positional concerns 
imply that their effect on risk-taking (more risk-taking in the unfavorable domain, 
less in the favorable domain) should be all the stronger the closer the probability 
17 Indeed, winning can include draws (or not). This gives some degrees of freedom in the model that can 
be used to predict a safe choice for the equal situation.
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is to 0.5. Put differently, we should hardly observe any effect for T1, where p = 0.1, 
and observe a strong effect for T4, where p = 0.4. This is clearly the opposite of what 
we find. Although in theory compatible with the general results, details of the data 
make it unlikely that positional concerns explain our results.
The third explanation is the idea that the other’s payoff could play the role of 
a reference point in prospect theory, an idea developed by Linde and Sonnemans 
(2012). Consequently, gain and loss domains would be defined through the earn-
ings of the other participant, predicting more risk-seeking in the loss domain (unfa-
vorable situations) and more risk-aversion in the gain domain (favorable situations). 
When in favorable situations, subjects in our experiment could mainly lose relative 
to the other participant when choosing the risky option. Instead, by selecting the 
safe option they can secure their relative social gain. In contrast to that, in unfa-
vorable situations, subjects are not much affected by the prospect of getting (0,10) 
rather than (1,9) because of diminishing sensitivity (i.e. convex utility) in the (rela-
tive) loss domain. Gambling in this case means a large probability of a subjectively 
small loss but a small probability of a very large gain. Such reasoning could also 
help to explain the data by Haisley et al. (2008) who show that, when reminded of 
their low status, low income individuals were more likely to engage in risky pur-
chases such as buying lottery tickets. It is also the reasoning of Schwerter (2013), 
indicating that decision-makers indeed experience social losses and gains in a risk 
task when exposed to another participant receiving a varying fixed payment. The 
social reference point hypothesis hence corresponds quite well with the change of 
risk attitudes we observe between “social gains” and”social losses”, or the favorable 
domain and the unfavorable domain. In contrast to the two alternative hypotheses, 
the social reference point hypothesis has no particular implication for the size of the 
effect when p varies between 0.1 and 0.4, and more relevantly, does predict a strong 
aversion to risk at p = 0.5 (because of ‘relative’ loss aversion, and not because of the 
change of curvature, as generically put forth in Rabin 2000).
Our findings concerning individual heterogeneity are in line with arguments 
in favor of a social reference point. Those decision-makers that reduce the other’s 
payoff in the ring test—if anything—exhibit the overall pattern more strongly than 
those that do not. Reducing the other’s payoff can only be rationalized by making 
some form of relative comparisons with the matched participant and by a wish to 
earn more in relative terms (apart from pure forms of anti-social behavior). It is not 
surprising that these individuals are more strongly affected by social comparisons. 
The cluster analysis also helps rationalizing the patterns. Type-1 individuals, who 
drive the aggregate pattern described above, are not only disproportionally less often 
categorized as cooperative, they also explicitly state motivations based on a social 
reference point story. In the subjects’ comment section at the end of the experiment, 
where participants were supposed to elaborate on their motivation behind choices in 
the social context task, one type-1 subject explained switching to the risky option 
in the unfavorable cases by stating that “as long as I earned more than the other, I 
chose the certain amount”. Another explicitly wanted to “get a higher payoff than 
the other”. These statements are a specific characteristic of type-1 individuals.
In contrast to the large group of type-1 individuals, there seems to be some-
thing else driving behavior of type-2 and type-4 decision-makers. Responsibility 
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aversion is one potential explanation. Type-2 individuals are characterized by a 
switch towards indifference in unfavorable tasks in the social context—and slightly 
less pronounced in the favorable context. This might in part be driven by responsi-
bility avoidance, which could have also led to the results in Kircher et al. (2013). 
Subjects’ comments provide some indication for such a conclusion. One subject, for 
example, explicitly stated that she did not want to make the decision herself, but 
rather leave it to luck.18 Similar mechanisms could apply to type-4 subjects. Choos-
ing the risky option more often in favorable social decisions implies that, in the 
end, it is the random draw that establishes an uneven distribution and not the par-
ticipant’s choice. Procedural fairness concerns are another potential explanation for 
type-4 subjects. Even though procedural concerns (Trautmann 2009; Bolton et  al. 
2005; Saito2013) should play no role with equivalent expected outcomes for both 
options, it might still be that a subset of individuals perceives the risky lottery to be 
fairer in the favorable range. Giving a chance (even if small) to get the entire amount 
could be considered as more appropriate than implementing for sure a very unequal 
payoff structure. Some participants’ comments are consistent with both lines of rea-
soning. One subject explicitly stated that he or she chose out of fairness concerns 
and another said that probabilistic decisions reduce the responsibility and feeling of 
guilt.
5  Conclusion
Our data suggest that risk-taking is influenced by the relative social situation of the 
decision-maker. Compared to equivalent situations without a social context, more 
risk is chosen in unfavorable situations, while similar risk-taking is observed for 
favorable social situations. A large share of our decision-makers exhibits this pattern 
in a pronounced way.
This observed behavioral pattern cannot be straightforwardly explained by exten-
sions of models of outcome-based social preferences for stochastic environments 
based on expected utility theory. The overall asymmetric pattern rather points 
towards the importance of social reference points. Future experiments should try to 
assesses the robustness of this conclusion, in particular with respect to alternative 
explanations that are in line with the general pattern, but fail on the details of the 
observed behavior in our setup (positional concerns, gloating being stronger than 
envy). This is especially important as experimental results in the relevant literature 
are not all fully consistent in their results.
Our experimental results suggest that the role of social context may be criti-
cal also in understanding organizational and financial risk-taking. When subjects 
directly compete against each other (e.g., over resources or power), even without any 
explicit competition incentives such as tournament prizes, they might take excessive 
risks that they would not take absent information on outcomes of others. Information 
18 It also seems that these subjects are genuinely more altruistic. In both the deterministic and the proba-
bilistic dictator game, on average, they give the most to recipients.
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provision or the way this information is presented may affect managers and investors 
alike.
In a broader context, our study provides another piece of evidence for the idea 
that risk-taking is strongly affected by the social environment in which decisions 
take place. Future studies could test specific theoretical models of excessive risk-
taking that embed the risky situation into a social environment. Further, the social 
situation could be varied in different dimensions (such as the level of competition, 
the size of the references group, the presentation of information, etc.), not only along 
the outcome dimension.
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